Killer1 wrote:
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Blue Max isn't new to me. I've played the board game back in the early 90's just before the Miniatures Edition was released, then played that version of the game. One of the house rules I always seem to come across when playing with the different groups I have gamed with is in regards to fuel. Most gaming groups just ignore fuel all together or just tell all the gamers that everyone has the same number of fuel boxes. Usually that number is 45 or 50. This actually makes a HUGE difference in the games. In a good way. Especially for the Fokker DVII fighter. Its 37 fuel is ridiculous. What is the point of giving one plane half the fuel and another one twice as much fuel? Is there one?
I understand the "Fuel" is a game turn limit factor and not a reflection of how much fuel a plane uses in combat. I know that the fuel tank on a Fokker DVII is a little smaller than one on a F2B, but both planes could fly for hours, and so restricting this to a few minutes in combat seems pointless. A great idea would be to give ALL planes the same number of fuel boxes. 45 or 50 fuel boxes seems to be an average. Or at least make it an option to start a game so that everyone has the same number of fuel boxes.
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What does everyone else think about this?
The original idea behind the fuel values was, as you note, to restrict the length of a game. In a game system where the belt fed machineguns have no ammunition limits, some way to force a game to an end was, apparently, felt necessary. Unfortunately (personal opinion), fuel was selected for this. While the amount of fuel given to aircraft most certainly does produce the desired effect, it seems very questionable, especially with its highly negative impact on almost all German aircraft, and its quite limited basis in fact. [Technical Note: The method for determining the amount of fuel available to an aircraft was quite simple - it received 12.5 fuel boxes for each 1/2 hour of its flight endurance (with some fudging here and there).]
There were a large number of factors beyond simple maximum endurance which determined the length of time an aircraft could remain in combat. A few of these included;
Maximum altitude reached in the current mission
Time passed in the current mission
Whether or not the aircraft is flying in formation
The position of the aircraft in a formation
The operational characteristics of the aircraft
Of these, the factor which most brings into question the method for computing aircraft fuel allowances is the last listed. The effective characteristics of the aircraft were often much different than the raw data would suggest. Using as examples two aircraft mentioned in your post and elsewhere in this thread (and noting that this is a comparison of similar aircraft types - single seat fighters in this case);
The RAF S.E.5a had a technical maximum endurance approaching 2-1/2 hours. However, its effective flying time in formation and allowing for combat was about 1-1/2 hours. Further, its pilot instructions indicated that combat flights generally be limited to a maximum of about 1 hour.
The Fokker D.VII had a technical maximum endurance of about 1-1/2 hours. Its effective flying time in formation and allowing for combat was just under 1 hour.
This suggests that the ratio of the fuel amounts for these aircraft should not be 52 boxes to 37 boxes (or 140% advantage for the S.E.5a), but probably more like 65 minutes to 55 minutes (or 118% advantage for the S.E.5a), which would give the D.VII around 44 boxes of fuel. This, of course, assumes that one is only using the numerical fuel limitations for restricting engagement length, and not including other factors.
The use of fuel as a combat limiting factor also seems to be inconsistent with the way combats actually occurred. In my reading regarding World War I aerial combat, very rarely is fuel state mentioned as a primary reason for breaking off from an engagement. Far more common are ammunition limitations, gun jams which cannot be fixed, simple losses of sighting, and morale factors (the last being by far the most common reason for a disengagement).
It must also be pointed out that the pre-engagement situation for each force should be a critical factor in the combatants' fuel state. While the S.E.5a (for example) has a numerical advantage in fuel over the D.VII, a S.E.5a flight nearing the end of a patrol would be at a severe fuel disadvantage when engaged by a force of freshly airborne D.VIIs. However, such a discussion would lead to such things as variable fuel states and scenario victory conditions, which are probably beyond the scope of both this discussion and the plans for this site.
I have long thought that the fuel values were poorly selected and did not lead to fair scenarios, given that the Germans almost always are forced to fly in an unhistorical manner; being conservative and usually the ones to initiate a disengagement. A simple fix which would be both historically reasonable and effective for game play would be to multiply German fuel allowances by approximately 1.2. I am not, however, so foolish as to expect that such a correction will be made. |
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